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The End of Knowing Receipt
Robert Chambers*
This article addresses the nature of liability for knowing receipt of assets transferred 
in breach of trust, and argues that it is no different from liability for breach of trust. 
It arises because the recipient has obtained assets that are held in trust and, after 
becoming aware of the trust, has failed to perform the basic trust duties to preserve 
the trust assets and transfer them to the proper trustees. It is not a form of restitution 
of unjust or wrongful enrichment, so it should not matter whether the assets were 
received for the recipient’s own benefit.
* Professor of Private Law, King’s College London. This paper has a long 
history. A shorter version was first presented at the Higher Courts Judges 
Conference in Napier, New Zealand in 2011, and then at the University 
of Melbourne and University of Western Australia. The present version was 
recently presented at the National University of Singapore. I am grateful 
for the kind invitations to present this paper, the helpful comments 
and questions received, and the delightful and memorable introduction 
provided by Justice Sir Robert Chambers (1953-2013) when it was first 
presented.
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I. Introduction
The law regarding personal liability for knowing receipt of assets transferred in breach of trust or fiduciary duty has received an 
extraordinary amount of academic and judicial attention over the past 
30 years.1 Yet despite this flurry of attention (or perhaps because of it), 
the law in this area remains in a muddled and unsatisfactory state. There 
are disagreements over the various elements of the cause of action, which 
stem from a lack of consensus over the basic nature of the liability: is it a 
form of restitution of benefits received, compensation for losses caused, 
or something else? Part of the problem is the language used in this area. 
Words and phrases, such as “the first limb of Barnes v Addy”, “liability to 
account as a constructive trustee”, or even “knowing receipt” itself, tend 
to obscure more than they reveal. While complex concepts do require 
specialist terminology, it is possible to speak plainly in this area and reveal 
more.
A frequently quoted statement of the essential elements of liability 
1. The modern interest in the subject can be traced to a series of cases in the 
1970s and 1980s in which assets were misappropriated from companies 
by their directors or officers, and perhaps the longest article ever published 
in the Law Quarterly Review: Charles Harpum, “The Stranger as 
Constructive Trustee” (1986) 102 Law Quarterly Review 114-62, 267-91. 
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for knowing receipt was by Lord Justice Hoffmann in El Ajou v Dollar 
Land Holdings:2
This is a claim to enforce a constructive trust on the basis of knowing receipt. 
For this purpose the plaintiff must show, first, a disposal of his assets in breach 
of fiduciary duty; secondly, the beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets 
which are traceable as representing the assets of the plaintiff; and thirdly, 
knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets he received are traceable 
to a breach of fiduciary duty.3
While succinct, each part of this statement raises questions about the 
nature and ambit of knowing receipt. What does it mean to “enforce a 
constructive trust on the basis of knowing receipt”? On what basis does 
liability arise for “a disposal of [the plaintiff’s] assets in breach of fiduciary 
duty” if those assets were not held in trust? Why is “beneficial receipt by 
the defendant” required? What degree of “knowledge on the part of the 
defendant” will suffice?
I must confess that I once believed, as did the late Professor Peter 
Birks, that liability for knowing receipt was best understood as a form of 
restitution of unjust enrichment. I was first introduced to the subject as a 
doctoral student at a seminar at All Souls College in 1992.4 Enthusiasm 
for an explanation based on unjust enrichment was running high and 
was persuasively promoted in the writing of Peter Birks and others at the 
2. [1994] BCC 143 (CA (Civ)(Eng)). 
3. Ibid at 154. Quoted in Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(Overseas) Ltd v Akindele, [2001] Ch 437 (CA (Civ)(Eng)) at para 34 
[Akindele]; Caltong (Australia) Pty Ltd v Tong Tien See Construction Pte 
Ltd, [2002] 3 SLR 241 (CA) at para 31; Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding, 
[2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch) at para 1478 [Ultraframe]; First Energy Pte 
Ltd v Creanovate Pte Ltd, [2006] SGHC 240 at para 53; Comboni v 
Shankar’s Emporium (Pte) Ltd, [2007] SGHC 55 at para 49; Zambia v 
Meer Care & Desai, [2007] EWHC 952 (Ch) at para 515; OJSC Oil Co 
Yugraneft v Abramovich, [2008] EWHC 2613 (QB (Comm)) at para 
248; Zage v Rasif, [2008] SGHC 244 at para 14; Arthur v A-G Turks & 
Caicos Islands, [2012] UKPC 30 (T&C) at para 32 [Arthur]; Otkritie 
International Investment Management Ltd v Urumov, [2014] EWHC 191 
(QB (Comm)) at para 81.
4. See Peter Birks, ed, The Frontiers of Liability (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994) Part I.
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time.5 If based on unjust enrichment, there seemed no good reason to 
insist on knowledge, notice, or some element of fault on the part of the 
recipient as a condition of liability. Strict liability coupled with the defence 
of change of position then seemed both logical and inevitable. Peter later 
retreated from that position, accepting that liability for knowing receipt 
was based on fault, but with liability for restitution of unjust enrichment 
as an added string to the plaintiff’s bow.6
Much of what follows has been said before, although not all in 
one place. The law in this area is not (or least does not have to be) as 
complicated as it appears. Some basic principles can be stated, and 
although some are controversial, they are set out below in the hope that 
this might help resolve some of the uncertainty and controversy in the 
area. Perhaps that is too much to expect, but at least it cannot hurt to 
state things as clearly and simply as possible, and at least hope not muddy 
the waters any further.
Simply stated, liability for knowing receipt is nothing other than 
liability for breach of trust. It arises because the recipient has obtained 
assets that are held in trust, and after becoming aware of the trust, has 
failed to perform the basic trust duties to preserve the trust assets and 
transfer them to either the beneficiaries or the proper trustees. This 
requires actual knowledge of the trust or the circumstances giving rise 
to it. Notice is insufficient. This is not a form of restitution of unjust 
or wrongful enrichment, so it should not matter whether the assets 
were received for the recipient’s own benefit. The recipient is an actual 
trustee and not just being treated as if that was true. This is not a form 
of accessory or secondary liability. It is fundamentally different from 
liability for knowingly assisting a breach of trust or fiduciary duty.
Liability for knowing receipt depends upon receiving trust assets 
and holding them in trust. Therefore, if the recipient obtains title free of 
5. Ibid. See the following essays in that collection: Peter Birks, “Gifts of 
Other People’s Money” Ch 31; Charles Harpum, “The Basis of Equitable 
Liability” Ch 9 at 24-25; William Swadling, “Some Lessons from the Law 
of Torts” Ch 41.
6. Peter Birks, “Receipt” in Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto, eds, Breach of Trust 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 213 [Birks & Pretto, Breach of Trust]. 
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the trust as a bona fide purchaser or through indefeasibility of registered 
title, liability for knowing receipt is not possible. Where assets were not 
held in trust prior to receipt, but were misappropriated from a company 
in breach of fiduciary duty, liability for knowing receipt is not possible 
unless a trust arises.
None of this precludes the possibility of a separate claim for restitution 
of unjust enrichment. However, there is no need to recognise a new 
equitable cause of action to achieve this. The recipient of misappropriated 
trust funds can be personally liable at common law for restitution of the 
value of those funds, subject to the defences of bona fide purchase and 
change of position.
II. Breach of Trust
The most important contribution to this area of law in recent years is 
an essay by Professor Charles Mitchell and Dr Stephen Watterson called 
“Remedies for Knowing Receipt”.7 They demonstrate convincingly that 
liability for knowing receipt cannot be explained in terms of unjust 
enrichment, but is the liability for failing to perform a duty to “restore 
the misapplied trust property”.8 Where I depart from them is in their 
reluctance to describe this as a breach of trust. This reluctance was not 
shared by Mr Simon Gardner, who described knowing receipt as “liability 
for breach of trust”,9 and went on to say:
‘knowing receipt’ is simply the usual liability for failure to preserve trust 
property, applicable to all trustees, given particular application to those who are 
trustees because they receive illicitly transferred trust property. The cognisance 
requirement in ‘knowing receipt’ is no more than a reminder that, before a 
7. Charles Mitchell & Stephen Watterson, “Remedies for Knowing Receipt” 
in Charles Mitchell, ed, Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2010) at 115.
8. Ibid at 132. See Arthur, supra note 3 at para 37. See also Michael Bryan, 
“Recipient Liability under the Torrens System: Some Category Errors” 
in Charles Rickett & Ross Grantham, eds, Structure and Justification in 
Private Law: Essays for Peter Birks (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) 340 at 
342-44.
9. Simon Gardner, “Moment of Truth for Knowing Receipt?” (2009) 125:1 
Law Quarterly Review 20 at 22.
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trustee who loses trust property will thereby breach his duty to preserve it, 
he must have been aware (or could have been aware, or whatever standard 
is chosen) of the need to preserve it, i.e. of the facts giving rise to the trust.10
Mitchell and Watterson base their approach on the nature of the 
accounting process through which trustees can become personally liable 
to pay for the value of misapplied trust assets even in the absence of an 
allegation of breach of trust:
[b]ecause the main liability of a knowing recipient is to perform his primary 
duty of restoration in just the same way as an express trustee, it is a distinctive 
form of liability which cannot be collapsed into other forms of liability which 
arise in the law of wrongs or the law of unjust enrichment.11
Having discussed this at length with Charles Mitchell, this is a point over 
which we agree to disagree. This may be only tangentially related to the 
issues at hand since it concerns the liabilities of all trustees and not just 
knowing recipients. However, in pursuit of the goal of speaking plainly, 
the liability of the knowing recipient is most usefully explained simply as 
liability for breach of trust.12
Beneficiaries are entitled to an account from their trustees because 
maintaining and providing accounts are primary duties of the trustee. 
No allegation of breach of duty is required. The account can then be 
falsified (by striking out unauthorised dispositions) or surcharged (by 
adding assets which the trustees failed to obtain), leading to a personal 
liability to pay.13 In either case, the adjustment depends on a breach 
of duty by commission or omission. A trustee who properly performs 
the trust is never personally liable to pay for losses to the trust. As Lord 
Justice Lindley said in Re Chapman,14 “a trustee is not a surety, nor is he 
an insurer; he is only liable for some wrong done by himself, and loss 
10. Ibid at 23.
11. Supra note 7 at 136.
12. Ibid, (Mitchell and Watterson describe it as “specific or substitutive 
performance of his primary duty”).
13. Ultraframe, supra note 3 at para 1513-17; Glazier v Australian Men’s 
Health (No 2), [2001] NSWSC 6 (Austl) at para 38, rev’d [2002] 
NSWCA 22 (Austl) at para 13; Robert Chambers, “Liability” in Birks & 
Pretto, Breach of Trust, supra note 6, 1 at 16-20.
14. [1896] 2 Ch 763 (CA (Eng)).
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of trust money is not per se proof of such wrong”.15 It is true that an 
authorised disposition might be struck out if the trustees failed to keep 
adequate records and are therefore unable to prove that it was authorised, 
but again, that liability arises from a breach of their duty to maintain 
adequate records.
Breach of trust, like many other breaches of duty, does not require 
dishonesty or neglect. Honest, well-meaning trustees may be strictly liable 
for unauthorised dispositions of the trust assets.16 Having undertaken a 
duty to perform the trust, they can be liable for failing to do so. The office 
of express trustee can be onerous. However, it is a startling proposition to 
say that trustees who have properly performed the trust could yet become 
personally liable to dig into their own pockets.
This proposition becomes more startling still when applied to 
knowing recipients. According to Mitchell and Watterson,17 their liability 
to pay is generated neither by wrongdoing nor unjust enrichment, and 
since they have not undertaken the office of express trustee, it cannot 
be explained in terms of consent. If true, we are left in search for some 
other explanation why people who have done no wrong, received no 
benefit, and made no undertaking or agreement, can or should be liable 
to pay. This is difficult to justify to other lawyers or judges, let alone to 
a lay person subjected to that liability, and creates a justifiable fear that 
something has gone wrong with the analysis.
The better explanation is that people who know they hold assets 
transferred to them in breach of trust are under trust duties to preserve 
those assets and restore them to the proper persons. Any other use of the 
assets is unauthorised and a breach of trust, which may lead to a liability 
to pay.
The knowing recipient’s liability to pay can be generated by the 
15. Ibid at 775.
16. Eaves v Hickson (1861), 30 Beav 136 (Ch (Eng)) at 141; National Trustees 
Co of Australasia Ltd v General Finance Co of Australasia Ltd, [1905] AC 
373 (PC (Austl)) at 379.
17. Supra note 7.
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accounting process without an allegation of breach of trust.18 The duty 
to account arises on proof that the recipient received the trust assets 
and acquired knowledge of the beneficiaries’ claim.19 Presumably, there 
is no duty to account before those two conditions are satisfied, so the 
beneficiaries would bear the onus of proving (with the aid of the normal 
litigation discovery process) that the recipient still held trust assets when 
sufficient knowledge of the breach was acquired. At that point, the onus 
would shift to the recipient to account as trustee for any subsequent 
dealings with those assets.
III. Source of the Knowing Recipient’s Duties
Explaining the liability to pay in terms of breach of duty helps, but does 
not provide a complete solution, because it does not explain the source 
of the duty breached. Knowing recipients do not consent to the office 
of express trustee and have not undertaken the duties associated with it. 
When they become aware of the trust they do not thereby assume all of 
the duties of an express trustee, but become subject only to the duties 
to preserve the trust assets and restore them to the proper persons. If 
the proper persons cannot be identified, the duty to preserve trust assets 
appears to include the duty to invest trust money in an interest-bearing 
bank account.20
While it can be risky drawing analogies with other areas of law, this 
is somewhat similar to the duty of care that can be imposed on a bailee of 
goods, even though the bailee has had no direct dealings with the owner 
and may even be a finder of the goods.21 As Justice Blanchard said in R 
v Ngan,22 “[a]t common law any person who finds an item of property 
and takes possession of it on behalf of the true owner as a temporary 
custodian is treated as a bailee of that property and is under an obligation 
18. Ibid at 136; Green v Weatherill, [1929] 2 Ch 213 (KB (Eng)) at 222-23 
[Green].
19. Green, ibid.
20. Evans v European Bank Ltd, [2004] NSWCA 82 (Austl) at para 162; supra 
note 7 at 138-40.
21. Newman v Bourne & Hollingsworth (1915), 31 TLR 209 (KB (Eng)).
22. [2008] 2 NZLR 48 (SC).
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to keep it safe and return it to the owner (if that is possible)”.23 And in P 
& O Nedlloyd BV v Utaniko Ltd,24 Lord Justice Mance said: 
[a]s a matter of principle and because the essence of bailment is the bailee’s 
voluntary possession of another’s goods, an owner’s remedies cannot necessarily 
be confined to situations involving either a direct bailment or a sub-bailment. 
A’s goods may come into the possession of B as a voluntary bailee in other 
circumstances. … When ascertaining the scope of bailment in contemporary 
legal conditions, there is general wisdom in Professor Palmer’s observation 
that: ‘The important question is not the literal meaning of bailment but the 
circle of relationships within which its characteristic duties will apply. For most 
practical purposes, any person who comes knowingly into the possession of 
another’s goods is, prima facie, a bailee.’25
Similarly, the knowledge that one has obtained title to an asset that is 
held in trust for another carries with it the limited duties to preserve 
the asset and get it back where it belongs. The beneficiaries of the trust 
cannot enforce all their rights under the express trust against the knowing 
recipient. Most of those rights are rights in personam that can be enforced 
only against the express trustees who have voluntarily undertaken the 
corresponding duties to perform the trust with care, loyalty, etc. However, 
the beneficiaries’ right to have the trust assets held and managed by 
properly appointed trustees can be enforced more generally against 
others.26
It is tempting to explain the recipient’s duties to preserve and 
restore trust assets on the basis of consent, since those duties (or at 
least the liability for their breach) depend on knowledge of the trust. 
The comparable duties of the bailee were explained on the basis of “an 
assumption of responsibility” by Lord Pearson, giving the advice of the 
Privy Council in Gilchrist Watt & Sanderson Pty Ltd v York Products Pty 
23. Ibid at 59.
24. [2003] EWCA Civ 83. 
25. Ibid at para 26 (quoting Norman Palmer, Bailment, 2d (Sydney: The Law 
Book Company Limited, 1991) at 1285).
26. See Richard Nolan, “Equitable Property” (2006) 122:2 Law Quarterly 
Review 232 (“a beneficiary’s core proprietary rights under a trust consist 
in the beneficiary’s primary, negative, right to exclude non-beneficiaries 
from the enjoyment of trust assets” at 233).
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Ltd:27
both in an ordinary bailment and in a ‘bailment by finding’ the obligation 
arises because the taking of possession in the circumstances involves an 
assumption of responsibility for the safekeeping of the goods. … [A]lthough 
there was no contract or attornment between the plaintiffs and the defendants, 
the defendants by voluntarily taking possession of the plaintiffs’ goods, in the 
circumstances assumed an obligation to take due care of them and are liable to 
the plaintiffs for their failure to do so … 28
This is perhaps the best we can do, but the duties of the knowing recipient 
look like they were imposed by operation of law rather than having been 
voluntarily undertaken. They arise even if the knowing recipient was an 
active participant in a scheme to misappropriate assets from the trust, 
clearly with no intention whatsoever to undertake any trust obligations 
towards the beneficiaries. They can also arise when the defendant 
honestly receives the assets and only later discovers the breach of trust. 
That is different from the honest finder who chooses to take possession 
of a lost item, but not unlike someone who accepts goods unaware they 
were delivered by mistake.
Turning to the law of wrongs does not help, because the duties 
to preserve and restore trust assets arise even if the recipient is honest 
and fully intends to perform them. It is tempting to say that they arise 
because the recipient’s conscience is affected by knowledge of the trust,29 
but that is merely a conclusion and does not explain why it is affected. If 
conscience requires the preservation and restoration of the trust assets, it 
can only be because there are duties to do so. The appeal to conscience 
does not help identify the source of those duties nor the precise conditions 
that must exist before they arise.30
The law of unjust enrichment might explain why the trust arises 
in cases where the assets were not held in trust before receipt or where 
the assets received are the traceable proceeds of the assets originally 
27. [1970] 3 All ER 825 (PC (Austl)). 
28. Ibid at 831-32. See also Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) at 10-11.
29. Akindele, supra note 3 at paras 55-70.
30. Birks, supra note 6 at 226.
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misappropriated from the trust.31 It could be said that the recipient has 
been unjustly enriched at the expense of the trust beneficiaries by receipt 
of those assets. However, this does not explain the superadded duty of 
care that arises when the recipient acquires knowledge of the trust. That 
duty arises because the recipient knows he or she is holding assets in 
trust and it does not matter whether the trust is express, resulting, or 
constructive, nor why it has arisen.32
IV. Knowledge or Notice
Many of those who have argued that liability for knowing receipt is based 
on fault have also said that recipients can be liable even if they did not 
know that the assets were transferred to them in breach of trust but had 
only notice of that fact.33 Professor Charles Harpum wrote:
[b]ecause the issue in cases of knowing receipt is essentially a proprietary one, 
a recipient of trust property may be liable as a constructive trustee if he failed 
to make the inquiries that he ought to have made, even though he acted in 
good faith. It is taken for granted in the cases that constructive notice of the 
impropriety of the transfer suffices for liability, and the emphasis is on whether 
the circumstances were such as to put the recipient on inquiry.34 
31. Foskett v McKeown, [2001] 1 AC 102 (HL)(appears to rule out this 
possibility, at least in cases where the assets were misappropriated 
from a trust) [Foskett]; see James Penner, “Value, Property, and Unjust 
Enrichment: Trusts of Traceable Proceeds” in Robert Chambers, Charles 
Mitchell & James Penner, eds, The Philosophical Foundations of the Law 
of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 306 at 
306. Compare Peter Birks, “Property, Unjust Enrichment, and Tracing” 
(2001) 54:1 Current Legal Problems 231; Andrew Burrows, “Proprietary 
Restitution: Unmasking Unjust Enrichment” (2001) 117:3 Law Quarterly 
Review 412; Robert Chambers, “Tracing and Unjust Enrichment” in 
Jason Neyers, Mitchell McInnes & Stephen Pitel, eds, Understanding 
Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 263 [Chambers, 
“Unjust Enrichment”].
32. Gardner, supra note 9 at 24.
33. David Fox, “Constructive Notice and Knowing Receipt: An Economic 
Analysis” (1998) 57:2 Cambridge Law Journal 391 at 391.
34. Charles Harpum, “The Stranger as Constructive Trustee: Part 2” (1986) 
102:2 Law Quarterly Review 267 at 273.
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Justice Millett (as he then was) said in Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson:35
the person who receives for his own benefit trust property transferred to him in 
breach of trust … is liable as a constructive trustee if he received it with notice, 
actual or constructive, that it was trust property and that the transfer to him 
was a breach of trust, or if he received it without such notice but subsequently 
discovered the facts. In either case he is liable to account for the property, in the 
first case as from the time he received the property and in the second as from 
the time he acquired notice.36
This was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada, in 
Citadel General Assurance Co v Lloyds Bank Canada,37 where Justice La 
Forest went on to say:
relief will be granted where a stranger to the trust, having received trust 
property for his or her own benefit and having knowledge of facts which 
would put a reasonable person on inquiry, actually fails to inquire as to the 
possible misapplication of trust property. It is this lack of inquiry that renders 
the recipient’s enrichment unjust.38
Later in an obiter dictum in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley 39 (“Twinsectra”), 
Lord Millett said:
[l]iability for ‘knowing receipt’ is receipt-based. It does not depend on fault. 
The cause of action is restitutionary and is available only where the defendant 
received or applied the money in breach of trust for his own use and benefit: 
see Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] Ch 265, 291-292; Royal Brunei Airlines 
Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378, 386. There is no basis for requiring actual 
knowledge of the breach of trust, let alone dishonesty, as a condition of 
liability. Constructive notice is sufficient, and may not even be necessary. 
There is powerful academic support for the proposition that the liability of 
the recipient is the same as in other cases of restitution, that is to say strict but 
subject to a change of position defence.40
The most notable exception to this trend is the judgment of Vice 
35. [1990] Ch 265 (QB (Eng)).
36. Ibid at 291 (there was no appeal on the issue of knowing receipt: Agip 
(Africa) Ltd v Jackson, [1990] EWCA Civ 2 at 567).
37. [1997] 3 SCR 805 at para 42 [Citadel].
38. Ibid at para 49.
39. [2002] UKHL 12 [Twinsectra]. 
40. Ibid at para 105. See also Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam, [2002] 
UKHL 48 at para 87; Peter Millett, “Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud” 
(1991) 107:1 Law Quarterly Review 71 at 80-83 [Millet, “Tracing”].
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Chancellor Megarry in Re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts 41 (“Re Montagu”), 
in which a person had received assets in breach of trust and disposed of 
them with notice, but no knowledge of the breach. Megarry VC held 
that personal liability for knowing receipt “primarily depends on the 
knowledge of the recipient, and not on notice to him; and for clarity it 
is desirable to use the word ‘knowledge’ and avoid the word ‘notice’ in 
such cases”.42
In Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v 
Akindele,43 Lord Justice Nourse said “[t]he recipient’s state of knowledge 
must be such as to make it unconscionable for him to retain the benefit 
of the receipt”.44 The reference to knowledge might be taken as an 
endorsement of Megarry VC’s view, and this is how it has been interpreted 
in at least one subsequent case.45 However, Nourse LJ also stated that it is 
unnecessary to distinguish “between actual and constructive knowledge” 
in this context.46 Since constructive knowledge includes “knowledge of 
circumstances which will put an honest and reasonable man on inquiry”, 
it appears to extend to notice without knowledge.47
All agree that liability for knowingly assisting a breach of trust 
or fiduciary duty requires actual knowledge (perhaps with an added 
41. [1987] 1 Ch 264 (HC (Eng)).
42. Ibid at 285.
43. [2001] Ch 437 (CA (Civ)(Eng)).
44. Ibid at 455.
45. In Papamichael v National Westminster Bank, [2003] EWHC 164 (QB), 
Judge Chambers QC (“in Akindele, the application of the precept to the 
facts of that case seems to leave little room for manoeuvre. The case … 
makes it pretty clear that the type of knowledge that is required is actual 
rather than constructive knowledge. Such a requirement does away with 
the suggestion of a balance having to be struck between the relative 
urgency of a transaction and the degree of notice required: if you know, 
you know” at para 247).
46. Supra note 43 at 455.
47. Ibid at 454.
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element of dishonesty).48 There are two different reasons (revealed in 
the quotations above) why the receipt of assets might justify imposing 
liability on the basis of notice without knowledge: one because it involves 
the receipt of property and the other because it involves the receipt of a 
benefit. However, as discussed below, neither reason justifies a reduction 
from knowledge to notice, and if it did, there would be no reason to stop 
at notice: strict liability should be the logical result.
V.  Bona Fide Purchase
Since liability for knowing receipt depends on receiving assets held in 
trust, it cannot arise if recipients take the assets free of the trust as bona 
fide purchasers for value without notice. This will not change if they later 
acquire notice or knowledge of the breach. They are free to continue 
to use and enjoy the assets as they please and can sell them to others 
who know of the breach of trust.49 Otherwise, the defence of bona ﬁde 
purchase would fail to protect them adequately, and a well publicised 
breach of trust would destroy the market value of the assets. Knowledge 
only matters if the recipient is still holding the assets in trust when that 
knowledge is acquired.
If the purchasers have notice of the breach of trust and are therefore 
not protected by the defence of bona fide purchase, it does not necessarily 
mean they can be personally liable for knowing receipt. Although the 
trust will survive the transaction, recipients with notice may honestly be 
unaware of the breach, and in that case should not be personally liable 
for disposing of the assets in breach of trust. These are two different 
questions, as Megarry VC pointed out in Re Montagu:
the equitable doctrine of tracing and the imposition of a constructive trust 
by reason of the knowing receipt of trust property are governed by different 
rules and must be kept distinct. Tracing is primarily a means of determining 
48. Air Canada v M & L Travel Ltd, [1993] 3 SCR 787; Royal Brunei Airlines 
Sdn Bhd v Tan, [1995] 2 AC 378 (Brunei) [Royal Brunei]; Twinsectra, 
supra note 39; Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust International 
Ltd, [2005] UKPC 37 (Isle of Man) [Barlow]; Enbridge Gas Distribution 
Inc v Marinaccio, 2012 ONCA 650 [Enbridge].
49. Wilkes v Spooner, [1911] 2 KB 473 (CA (Eng)) at 487.
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the rights of property, whereas the imposition of a constructive trust creates 
personal obligations that go beyond mere property rights.50
This language was criticised by Lord Millett (writing extra-judicially) as 
“unhelpful”: “tracing is not a means of determining property rights; it is 
not even confined to proprietary claims: while the constructive trust does 
not necessarily attract personal obligations at all”.51 Nevertheless, there is 
a fundamental difference between the beneficiaries’ proprietary interest 
in the trust assets (or their traceable proceeds) and their personal claim 
against the recipient for failing to preserve those assets and restore them 
to the proper parties.
It is one thing to purchase an asset and find out it is less valuable than 
expected. The purchaser will usually have a claim against the vendor for 
breach of warranty of title. However, it would be going too far to increase 
the purchaser’s woes by adding personal liability to the beneficiaries of 
the trust. We are willing to enforce property rights generally against 
others (subject to rules protecting honest buyers) because they do not 
impose positive obligations against others, but only negative limitations 
on their use or enjoyment of things.52 Setting the standard at notice can 
be regarded as consistent with this (although registration statutes usually 
provide greater levels of protection). To impose positive obligations 
normally requires consent, wrongdoing, or at least a level of knowledge 
that permits the recipient to make a choice whether to incur that liability 
or not. Notice short of knowledge does not suffice.
If, as Professor Harpum suggested (above), notice is sufficient for 
liability because “the issue in cases of knowing receipt is essentially a 
proprietary one”,53 there would be no good reason why notice should 
be required in cases where the recipient is a donee. Although we often 
refer to the defence of bona fide purchase as the “doctrine of notice”, it 
should not be forgotten that notice is entirely irrelevant when assets are 
50. Supra note 41 at para 58; quoted with approval in Arthur, supra note 3 at 
para 34. 
51. Peter Millett, “Restitution and Constructive Trusts” (1998) 114:3 Law 
Quarterly Review 399 at 403.
52. Rhone v Stephens, [1994] 2 AC 310 (HL) at 318.
53. Supra note 34 at 273. 
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acquired by a donee. Taken to its logical conclusion, a justification based 
solely on the priority rules governing equitable interests would lead to the 
conclusion that liability for knowing receipt should be strict, subject to 
the defence of bona fide purchase.54
VI. Indefeasibility
If the bona fide purchaser is immune to liability for knowing receipt, 
the same must also be true when the asset received is registered title to 
land and the recipient is protected by the indefeasibility provisions of 
the registration statute. The increased protection provided by registration 
may mean that liability for knowing receipt is not possible even if the 
recipient has actual knowledge of the breach at the time. In a Torrens 
system, where indefeasibility is denied to a registered proprietor guilty 
of actual fraud, this depends on how the courts define fraud. It is not 
fraud to know that the land was held in trust,55 nor that registration will 
destroy the beneficiaries’ interest in the land.56 There is no duty to inquire 
into the possibility that the land is being transferred in breach of trust,57 
but it had long been understood that it is fraud to know or suspect a 
breach of trust.58
Recently, Australian courts have decided that it is not fraud for 
the registered proprietor to obtain land knowing it was transferred in 
breach of trust so long as the trustees were not guilty of fraud. In Farah 
Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd 59 (“Farah Constructions”), the 
High Court of Australia said that Torrens fraud means “actual fraud, 
moral turpitude” and if the trustee is not guilty of “actual fraud”, then 
54. See note 55.
55. See e.g. Land Titles Act, RSA 2000, c L-4, s 203; Land Transfer Act 1952 
(NZ), 1952/S2, s 182; Land Titles Act (2004 Rev Ed Sing), s 47; Transfer 
of Land Act 1958 (Vic (Austl)), s 43.
56. RM Hosking Properties Pty Ltd v Barnes, [1971] SASR 100 at 103 (SC 
(Austl)).
57. See Millet, “Tracing”, supra note 40.
58. Assets Co Ltd v Mere Roihi, [1905] AC 176 (PC (NZ)) at 210; See also 
Arthur, supra note 3 at para 40.
59. [2007] HCA 22.
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“the other parties are in no worse position”.60
In LHK Nominees Pty Ltd v Kenworthy,61 land was purchased at half 
price from a trust company by its agent, who knew this was a breach of 
trust. Since there was no proof he had deceived the directors of the trust 
company, he obtained an indefeasible title. Justice Murray said “there 
would be no capacity to defeat the indefeasibility of title conferred by the 
Act by reason merely that title to the land was acquired in circumstances 
in which the recipient knew that the transfer to him was in breach of 
trust”.62
This is probably not the law outside Australia.63 It is at least 
inconsistent with the law of knowing assistance as developed by the Privy 
Council. In Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan,64 Lord Nicholls said 
that it is dishonest to participate in breach of trust, even if the trustee is 
acting honestly:
[u]nless there is a very good and compelling reason, an honest person does not 
participate in a transaction if he knows it involves a misapplication of trust 
assets to the detriment of the beneficiaries. Nor does an honest person in such 
a case deliberately close his eyes and ears, or deliberately not ask questions, lest 
he learn something, he would rather not know, and then proceed regardless.65
There has been some debate over whether a claim for knowing receipt falls 
within the “in personam exception” to indefeasibility.66 This may seem 
plausible if liability for knowing receipt is seen as a form of restitution of 
60. Ibid at para 192.
61. [2002] WASCA 291 (Austl)(leave to appeal dismissed [2003], HCATrans 
426).
62. Ibid at para 185.
63. See Arthur, supra note 3.
64. Royal Brunei, supra note 48.
65. Ibid at 389. See also Barlow, supra note 48.
66. This phrase was coined following a comment made by Lord Wilberforce 
in Frazer v Walker, [1967] 1 AC 569 (PC (NZ))(that the principle of 
immediate indefeasibility “in no way denies the right of a plaintiff to 
bring against a registered proprietor a claim in personam, founded in law 
or in equity, for such relief as a court acting in personam may grant” at 
585).
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unjust enrichment.67 The debate then turns to the question whether “the 
important functions of land registration would be stultified if knowing 
receipt were allowed to operate against a registered purchaser”.68 A majority 
of the Victoria Court of Appeal thought that this would indeed be the 
consequence. In Macquarie Bank Ltd v Sixty-Fourth Throne Pty Ltd,69 
Justice Tadgell said that liability for knowing receipt “would introduce 
by the back door a means of undermining the doctrine of indefeasibility 
which the Torrens system establishes”.70 This was cited with approval in 
an obiter dictum of the High Court of Australia in Farah Constructions,71 
and so this problem seems to be resolved in Australia.
If liability for knowing receipt is understood as liability for breach 
of trust, then the problem created by the in personam exception does not 
arise in this context. A recipient who obtains indefeasible title free of 
the trust cannot be a trustee and cannot be subject to the trust duties to 
preserve and restore trust assets.
It should not be assumed that a claim for knowing receipt will lie 
against a registered proprietor who obtained title by fraud. Although the 
recipient holds only a defeasible title and the trust will survive registration, 
he or she may be unaware of the trust. For example, it is fraud to submit a 
document for registration knowing that it was executed improperly, and 
its registration will not defeat any existing trust of the land.72 However, 
if the proprietor later disposes of the land and dissipates the proceeds in 
ignorance of the trust, there is no reason why he or she should be liable 
for breach of that trust.
67. See UK, Law Commission, Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century 
(Law Commission No 254)(HM Land Registry, 1998) at para 3.48. See 
also supra note 8.
68. Matthew Conaglen & Amy Goymour, “Knowing Receipt and Registered 
Land” in Charles Mitchell, ed, Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2010) 159 at 174.
69. [1998] 3 VR 133 (SC (Austl)).
70. Ibid at 157.
71. Supra note 59, at paras 193-96.
72. Australian Guarantee Corp Ltd v De Jager, [1984] VR 483 (SC (Austl)) at 
497-98.
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VII. Beneficial Receipt
If liability for knowing receipt is not restitutionary and is not based on 
unjust enrichment, there is no reason why it is necessary that the assets 
were received for the recipient’s own benefit. If assets are misappropriated 
from a trust for A and transferred to a recipient in trust for B, this is a 
simple question of priorities.73 If the recipient holds the assets subject 
to two inconsistent trusts, one will take priority over the other (usually, 
but not always, depending on which trust arose first).74 If the recipient 
of assets in trust for B knows that they were previously held in trust for 
A and transferred in breach of that trust, then it must be a breach of the 
trust for A if the recipient deals with them inconsistently with it, even if 
the actions are taken in obedience to the trust for B.
It has been assumed that receipt for one’s own benefit is a requirement 
for liability, and it is perhaps this assumption that leads to the conclusion 
that notice would be sufficient for imposing liability.75 However, if benefit 
is the key, then liability should be restitutionary and limited to the actual 
benefit obtained by the recipient. Also, there is no good reason to stop at 
notice, as Lord Millett noted in Twinsectra.76 Strict liability, subject to the 
defence of change of position is a far more sensitive means of achieving 
that goal. It can protect honest, well-meaning recipients who did not 
benefit from their receipt of the assets but nevertheless had notice of the 
breach of trust. Conversely, it can permit liability in cases where the assets 
were spent without notice of the trust, but on necessary expenditures that 
have left the recipient with a surviving enrichment at the beneficiaries’ 
expense.77
73. This is essentially what happened in Foskett, supra note 31.
74. Abigail v Lapin, [1934] AC 491 (PC (Austl)).
75. Citadel, supra note 37 at para 48; Gold v Rosenberg, [1997] 3 SCR 767 at 
para 46. 
76. Twinsectra, supra note 39 at para 105.
77. See Heperu Pty Ltd v Belle, [2009] NSWCA 252 (Austl) at para 80.
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VIII. Company Assets
If liability for knowing receipt is liability for breach of the trust duties 
to preserve the trust assets and restore them to the proper persons, then 
it cannot arise unless the assets are held in trust. Knowledge or notice 
of a breach of fiduciary duty is insufficient in the absence of a trust. 
The extension of liability to cases involving the misappropriation of 
company assets by directors and officers makes sense only if a trust arose 
by operation of law when the assets were received (or at some earlier or 
later stage).
Where company assets have been transferred pursuant to a contract 
with the company, the first and most important question is whether the 
contract is binding on the company. This is an issue concerning the actual 
or ostensible authority of the company’s agents, which has nothing to do 
with knowing receipt.78 It is true that similar questions may be involved. 
Agents do not have authority to deal fraudulently with their principal’s 
assets, and anyone who knows of the fraud cannot be relying on the 
agent’s ostensible authority.79 However, over the last 30 years, there has 
been a tendency to ignore this fundamental question of the validity of the 
contract and jump straight into the law of knowing receipt.
This problem was identified by the House of Lords in Criterion 
Properties v Stratford UK Properties LLC 80 (“Criterion”), where Lord 
Nicholls said:
if a company (A) enters into an agreement with B under which B acquires 
benefits from A, A’s ability to recover these benefits from B depends essentially 
on whether the agreement is binding on A. If the directors of A were acting for 
an improper purpose when they entered into the agreement, A’s ability to have 
the agreement set aside depends upon the application of familiar principles of 
agency and company law. If, applying these principles, the agreement is found 
to be valid and is therefore not set aside, questions of ‘knowing receipt’ by B do 
not arise. So far as B is concerned there can be no question of A’s assets having 
been misapplied. B acquired the assets from A, the legal and beneficial owner 
78. Robert Stevens, “The Proper Scope of Knowing Receipt” (2004) Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 421.
79. Peter Watts, “Authority and Mismotivation” (2005) 121:1 Law Quarterly 
Review 4 at 7.
80. [2004] UKHL 28.
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of the assets, under a valid agreement made between him and A. If, however, 
the agreement is set aside, B will be accountable for any benefits he may have 
received from A under the agreement. A will have a proprietary claim, if B still 
has the assets. Additionally, and irrespective of whether B still has the assets in 
question, A will have a personal claim against B for unjust enrichment, subject 
always to a defence of change of position. B’s personal accountability will not 
be dependent upon proof of fault or ‘unconscionable’ conduct on his part. B’s 
accountability, in this regard, will be ‘strict’.81
As Lord Nicholls pointed out, if the contract is voidable, the company 
will have a proprietary claim to any recoverable assets obtained by the 
other party to that contract.82 This must also be true where the contract 
is void or where there is no contract and company assets are simply 
misappropriated and transferred to the recipient. If the recipient is 
holding assets in trust for the company, then (and only then) does the 
possibility of liability for knowing receipt arise.
If assets have been transferred pursuant to a voidable contract that 
has not been avoided, there is no trust but merely a power to avoid the 
contract and thereby create a trust. The power to recover assets through 
rescission is an equitable interest in the recoverable assets (sometimes 
called a “mere equity”), but it is not beneficial ownership under a trust.83 
The recipient is bound by the contract until it is avoided. Rescission may 
have retroactive effect so that the trust is deemed to have arisen at the 
outset, but that cannot retroactively turn the actions of the recipient at 
a time when there was no trust into a wrongful breach of trust. As Lord 
Millett said (writing extra-judicially):
81. Ibid at para 4.
82. There was no discussion of the rescission of the contract of sale in 
Arthur, supra note 3, but the claim was brought by the Crown as vendor 
seeking to recover the land sold on the basis that Her minister had acted 
in breach of fiduciary duty by arranging the sale at a price significantly 
below market value. The must be understood as a claim to rescind the 
transaction.
83. Peter Birks, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths” (1997) 
New Zealand Law Review 623 at 637-48; Richard Nolan, “Dispositions 
Involving Fiduciaries: The Equity to Rescind and the Resulting Trust” 
in Peter Birks & Francis Rose, eds, Restitution and Equity Volume One: 
Resulting Trusts and Equitable Compensation (London: Routledge, 2000) 
119 at 132; Chambers, “Unjust Enrichment”, supra note 31 at 300.
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[i]n all these cases the beneficial interest passes, but the plaintiff has the right 
to elect whether to affirm the transaction or rescind it. If he elects to rescind 
it, it is usually assumed that the beneficial title revests in the plaintiff, and 
the authorities suggest that it does so retrospectively. But the recipient cannot 
anticipate his decision. Pending the plaintiff’s election to rescind, the recipient 
is entitled, and may be bound, to treat the payment as effective. It is well settled 
that the plaintiff’s subsequent rescission does not invalidate or render wrongful 
transactions which have taken place in the meantime on the faith of the 
receipt.... Pending rescission the transferee has the whole legal and beneficial 
interest in the property, but his beneficial title is defeasible. There is plainly no 
fiduciary relationship. The defeasible nature of the transferee’s title should not 
inhibit his use of the property.84
If there is no trust pending rescission, there cannot be any duties to 
preserve trust assets and restore them to the company. The absence of 
trust would not, however, preclude an action for knowingly assisting a 
breach of fiduciary duty.
IX. Unjust Enrichment
In the quotation from Criterion, above, Lord Nicholls raised the possibility 
of a personal claim for unjust enrichment. It should not be assumed that 
he was referring to liability for knowing receipt. Writing extra-judicially, 
he suggested that courts should recognise an additional form of personal 
liability to make restitution of unjust enrichment operating concurrently 
with liability for knowing receipt.85 This has been supported by Lord 
Walker writing extra-judicially and others.86
Lord Nicholls envisaged a new personal claim in equity.87 Lord 
Millett suggested that the common law was not up to the task,88 but it 
is not clear why that should be so. In most cases, it will be necessary to 
84. Supra note 51 at 416.
85. Lord Nicholls, “Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark” in 
William Robert Cornish et al, eds, Restitution Past, Present and Future: 
Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) 231.
86. Lord Walker, “Dishonesty and Unconscionable Conduct in Commercial 
Life—Some Reflections on Accessory Liability and Knowing Receipt” 
(2005) 27:2 Sydney Law Review 187 at 202; Birks, supra note 6; Gardner, 
supra note 9 at 24.
87. Supra note 85.
88. Millett, “Tracing”, supra note 40 at 76-80.
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show that the assets transferred to the recipient are the traceable proceeds 
of the assets misappropriated from the trust. It has long been assumed 
that equity’s tracing rules are superior to those of the common law, but 
it seems only a matter of time before the tracing rules are seen simply as 
rules of evidence that are the same regardless of the nature of the claim 
involved.89 If equity is not needed for the tracing process, and the claim 
is merely for the value of the assets received, there seems no reason why 
this cannot be done at common law.
In most cases where funds have been misappropriated from a 
company, they were not held in trust prior to the misappropriation. 
The company will have a claim at common law for restitution of unjust 
enrichment, or as we still like to think of it, an action for money had and 
received. There is no need to turn to equity except to assert a proprietary 
interest in assets in the recipient’s hands or to make a claim based on 
knowing receipt of those assets.
The same principles should apply in cases where assets have been 
misappropriated from a trust.90 While the beneficiaries do not have a 
direct claim at common law against the recipient, the trustees can sue 
at common law to recover money paid by mistake or in breach of trust. 
That claim is a trust asset which the trustees are required to realise. The 
beneficiaries can compel them to do their duty, and if necessary, have 
them replaced or possibly even bring the action with the trustees joined 
89. See Foskett, supra note 31 at 113, 128-29, per Lord Steyn and Lord 
Millett; Ultraframe, supra note 3 at paras 1461-64; BMP Global 
Distribution Inc v Bank of Nova Scotia, [2009] 1 SCR 504 at paras 75-
85; Peter Birks, “The Necessity of a Unitary Law of Tracing” in Ross 
Cranston, ed, Making Commercial Law: Essays in Honour of Roy Goode 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 239. 
90. Simon Gardner, “Knowing Assistance and Knowing Receipt: Taking 
Stock” (1996) 112:1 Law Quarterly Review 56 at 86 [Gardner, “Taking 
Stock”]; Gardner, supra note 9 at 24.
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as defendants.91
In the important but difficult case of Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale 
Ltd,92 the House of Lords recognised both the right to restitution of 
unjust enrichment and the defence of change of position. The facts are 
well known. Mr Cass, a partner in a firm of solicitors, misappropriated 
funds from the firm’s client trust account and gambled their traceable 
proceeds away at the defendant’s club. Although the monies paid to the 
defendant were undoubtedly trust funds, no equitable claims were made 
against it. The trust funds could no longer be traced and had been spent 
by the defendant honestly and in ignorance of the trust. So, the solicitors 
brought a common law claim for money had and received and succeeded, 
subject to the defendant’s partial defence of change of position.
The case is difficult because the House of Lords held that Cass, as a 
partner with authority to draw on the trust account, had obtained legal 
title to the money withdrawn.93 How then was the defendant enriched at 
the solicitors’ expense if Cass owned the money he paid to the defendant? 
The case becomes easier to understand if seen as a claim by trustees to 
recover the value of trust assets paid to the defendant in breach of trust. 
While Cass was the legal owner of the money he paid to the defendant, 
he was a trustee of the money paid. It cannot make a difference that he 
paid the traceable proceeds of money withdrawn from the trust account 
rather than paying directly from that account. His fellow trustees had 
a common law right to restitution of the value of that money (and an 
equitable duty to realise that claim).
There are three different potential claims against a recipient of assets 
transferred in breach of trust: (i) an equitable property claim to the assets 
or their traceable proceeds (which might be regarded as restitution of 
91. Marcus Smith, “Locus Standi and the Enforcement of Legal Claims by 
Cestuis Que Trust and Assignees” (2008) 22 Trust Law International 140 
at 156; Sharpe v San Paulo Railway Co (1873), LR 8 Ch App 597 (Eng) at 
609-10; Vandepitte v Preferred Accident Insurance Corp of New York, [1933] 
AC 70 (PC (Canada)) at 79.
92. [1991] 2 AC 548 (HL).
93. Ibid at 573.
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unjust enrichment);94 (ii) an equitable personal claim for knowing receipt 
(which might be regarded as the equitable equivalent to damages for 
breach of duty); and (iii) a common law personal claim for restitution of 
unjust enrichment. The first two belong to the beneficiaries and the third 
to the trustees. There is no need to give the beneficiaries a new equitable 
claim for restitution of unjust enrichment, since they can compel the 
trustees to assert their common law claim.
It has been suggested that the right to restitution of unjust enrichment 
will render the action for knowing receipt “otiose”95 or “irrelevant”.96 
However, they operate by different rules to achieve different goals. 
Knowing receipt does not require benefit to the recipient and unjust 
enrichment does not require wrongdoing.
X. Constructive Trusteeship
Very little has been said so far about knowing or dishonest assistance of 
a breach of trust or fiduciary duty. They have long been linked in our 
minds by Lord Selborne’s famous statement in Barnes v Addy:97
[t]hose who create a trust clothe the trustee with a legal power and control 
over the trust property, imposing on him a corresponding responsibility. That 
responsibility may no doubt be extended in equity to others who are not 
properly trustees, if they are found either making themselves trustees de son 
tort, or actually participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to the 
injury of the cestui que trust. But, on the other hand, strangers are not to be 
made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents of trustees in 
transactions within their legal powers, transactions, perhaps of which a Court 
of Equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become chargeable 
with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a 
dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees.98 
It is true that both forms of liability may arise in the same case, but it has 
been unhelpful and perhaps a source of confusion to refer to recipients 
94. Lionel Smith, “Unjust Enrichment, Property and the Structure of Trusts” 
(2000) 116:3 Law Quarterly Review 412 at 435.
95. Ibid at 413.
96. Gardner, “Taking Stock”, supra note 90 at 86; Gardner, supra note 9 at 
24.
97. (1874), LR 9 Ch App 244 (Eng). 
98. Ibid at 251-52.
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and assistants both as constructive trustees or to treat their liabilities as 
merely two limbs of the same tree.
Knowing assistants are liable as constructive trustees. Receipt of trust 
assets is not a condition of liability. They are not actual trustees, but 
by dishonestly participating in a breach of trust, they become subject 
to the same personal liabilities as if they were, including the liability to 
give up any profits derived from their wrongdoing.99 In this context, 
“constructive trustee” does not mean that knowing assistants are trustees 
of constructive trusts, but rather that they are only constructively trustees. 
As Mitchell and Watterson say:
[a] dishonest assistant is liable for his own wrongdoing, no less than a person 
who commits the tort of procuring a breach of contract, but at the same time, 
dishonest assistance is a ‘secondary’ wrong in the sense that it is defined by 
reference to the commission of a wrong by another person.100
In contrast, knowing recipients are actual trustees, and they are liable 
for breach of their own duties as trustees. The language of constructive 
trusteeship is unhelpful. We are perhaps reluctant to drop the label 
“constructive” because the recipients have not been expressly appointed to 
that office. However, people can become trustees in a variety of different 
ways. Whether a trust is express, constructive, resulting, or statutory, its 
trustee is a real trustee, and on becoming aware of the trust, is expected 
to perform the minimum duties expected of all trustees. A trustee must 
preserve the trust assets, and when required, transfer them to the proper 
parties.
Another important difference is that it is possible to knowingly 
assist a breach of fiduciary duty, even in the absence of any trust.101 In 
contrast, liability for knowing receipt requires the receipt of trust assets. 
This important difference has been long overlooked in cases involving the 
99. Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd, [1975] HCA 8 at 
para 5 [Consul]; Novoship (UK) Ltd v Nikitin, [2014] EWCA Civ 908 at 
para 82; Mysty Clapton, “Gain-Based Remedies for Knowing Assistance: 
Ensuring Assistants do Not Profit from their Wrongs” (2008) 45:4 Alberta 
Law Review 989 at 1015; Pauline Ridge, “Justifying the Remedies for 
Dishonest Assistance” (2008) 124:3 Law Quarterly Review 445 at 445. 
100. Supra note 7 at 152.
101. Consul, supra note 99 at para 25; Enbridge, supra note 48 at para 57.
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misappropriation of company assets, but as discussed above, the recipient 
of non-trust assets may hold them subject to a new trust arising on or 
after receipt, in which case a claim for knowing receipt becomes possible.
In Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria 102 (“Williams”), the UK 
Supreme Court rejected an argument that there was a significant 
difference between knowing assistance and knowing receipt for the 
purposes of the Limitation Act 1980.103 In 2010, Williams claimed that 
$6 million had been misappropriated from an express trust and paid to 
the defendant bank in 1986, and that the defendant was a party to the 
fraud. The court held that the claim was barred by the six-year limit on 
“an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of any 
breach of trust” and did not fall within the exception for “an action … 
in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee 
was a party or privy”.104
Lord Sumption decided that, like knowing assistants, knowing 
recipients are not “true trustees”:
the essence of a liability to account on the footing of knowing receipt is that 
the defendant has accepted trust assets knowing that they were transferred to 
him in breach of trust and that he had no right to receive them. His possession 
is therefore at all times wrongful and adverse to the rights of both the true 
trustees and the beneficiaries. No trust has been reposed in him. He does not 
have the powers or duties of a trustee, for example with regard to investment or 
management. His sole obligation of any practical significance is to restore the 
assets immediately. … There may also, in some circumstances, be a proprietary 
claim. But all this is simply the measure of the remedy. It does not make him a 
trustee or bring him within the provisions of the Limitation Act 1980 relating 
to trustees.105
The distinction between “true trustees” and other trustees is difficult. It 
is easy to understand why knowing assistants are not true trustees, since 
they do not hold assets in trusts and are only being treated as if they 
102. [2014] UKSC 10.
103. Limitation Act 1980 (UK), 1980, c 58.
104. Ibid, s 21. Many Canadian limitation statutes use similar language: see 
Albert Howard Oosterhoff, Robert Chambers & Mitchell McInnes, 
Oosterhoff on Trusts: Text, Commentary and Materials, 8d (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2014) at para 17.3.3.
105. Supra note 102 at para 31.
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were trustees for a limited purpose. However, knowing recipients are 
actual trustees with trust duties to preserve the trust assets and restore 
them to the proper persons. It is true that they do not have the usual 
powers and duties of investment and management, but that is also true 
of a great many express trustees. For example, in a typical conveyancing 
transaction, the lender will advance the mortgage proceeds to a solicitor 
to hold on bare trust for the lender with no power to use the money at 
all until certain conditions are fulfilled.106 The typical Quistclose trust is a 
bare trust for the lender coupled with a power to use the trust money for 
an agreed purpose,107 and custodian trustees might simply hold the trust 
assets to the order of the managing trustees. While these bare trustees 
have none of the usual powers or duties of many express trustees to invest 
and manage the trust assets, it is hard to imagine that they are not “true 
trustees” for limitation purposes.
Knowing assistants are liable for their involvement as an accessory 
to a breach of trust by the express trustee and so the cause of action 
against them accrues from the date of that breach. In contrast, knowing 
recipients are not liable for the express trustees’ breach, but are liable for 
their own breach of trust, which occurs later when they become aware 
that they are holding assets under a bare trust to preserve and restore 
them to the proper persons and then decide to use those assets contrary 
to the terms of that trust. It looks like a “fraudulent breach of trust to 
which the trustee was a party”,108 but that is not to say that Williams 
was wrongly decided. There may be good reasons for imposing a six-year 
limitation period on claims against knowing recipients, but it is difficult 
to justify that on the basis that they are not true trustees.
XI. Conclusion
Liability for knowing receipt is liability for breach of trust, pure and 
simple. It has taken me a long time to discover this basic truth. Professor 
Lionel Smith began to see the light long before I did. He questioned the 
106. See AIB Group (UK) v Mark Redler & Co, [2014] UKSC 58 at para 4.
107. See Twinsectra, supra note 39.
108. Supra note 103, s 21.
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momentum in favour of an explanation based on unjust enrichment, and 
saw that liability for knowing receipt was based on wrongdoing. In 1998, 
he wrote, “[i]t appears that the best view of knowing receipt is that it is 
equity’s analogue to the common law’s claim in conversion”.109
I found the analogy to conversion difficult, because it did not explain 
why knowledge or notice should be required for liability in equity. 
Liability based on notice seemed the worst of all possible worlds. Honest, 
well-meaning people can be caught by notice of things they might have 
discovered with more care. It does not provide a sufficient reason to 
make them personally liable if they have received no benefit from use of 
the trust assets, and if they are enriched, there seems no good reason to 
require it.
The better analogy is to bailment. The recipient, as trustee, is a 
custodian of the trust assets, with the duties to preserve and restore them 
to the proper persons. By making this plain, Mitchell and Watterson have 
helped us make a great stride forward in this area of law.
So why is this the end of knowing receipt? Because there is nothing 
special about it. All trustees, upon learning of the trust, have duties to 
preserve the trust assets and account to the beneficiaries. The knowing 
recipient is, like every other trustee, subject to those basic trust duties. 
Personal liability for breach of trust depends on knowledge of the existence 
of the trust, but that is true of all trusts, whether express, resulting, or 
constructive. 
In Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough 
Council,110 Lord Browne-Wilkinson suggested that there is no trust until 
the trustee becomes aware of it:
[s]ince the equitable jurisdiction to enforce trusts depends upon the conscience 
of the holder of the legal interest being affected, he cannot be a trustee of 
the property if and so long as he is ignorant of the facts alleged to affect his 
conscience, i.e. until he is aware that he is intended to hold the property for 
the benefit of others in the case of an express or implied trust, or, in the case of 
a constructive trust, of the factors which are alleged to affect his conscience.111
109. Lionel Smith, “W(h)ither Knowing Receipt” (1998) 114:3 Law Quarterly 
Review 394 at 394. See also Smith, supra note 94.
110. [1996] AC 669 (HL).
111. Ibid at 705.
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However (as I have argued elsewhere),112 the trustee’s ignorance of the 
trust should not prevent it from arising, but will preclude personal 
liability for breach of the trust. This would mean that a trust does not 
cease to exist just because the trust assets are misdirected to an honest 
recipient who is unaware of the trust. On either view, there is nothing 
special or different about the knowledge required for knowing receipt 
that sets that liability apart from the personal liability of any other trustee 
or connects it to the liability of the knowing assistant.
Similarly, there is nothing special about receipt in this context. 
All trusts require subject matter and no one becomes an actual trustee 
until he or she receives the trust assets. When concerned with the initial 
creation of an express trust, we usually refer to this as the constitution of 
the trust.
The generality of the concept of receipt has the potential to mislead. 
It appears to many to be akin to, or even an instantiation of, the 
enrichment required to trigger liability for unjust enrichment. However, 
despite frequent assertions to the contrary, there is no good reason why 
liability should depend on the benefit to the recipient. Also, we routinely 
receive assets that are not held in trust. So, the mere receipt of misdirected 
assets is not sufficient unless they are held in trust by the recipient when 
knowledge is acquired. A successful defence of bona fide purchase or 
indefeasibility of registered title negates that possibility. The receipt of 
assets not previously held in trust cannot trigger liability for knowing 
receipt unless a trust arises upon or after receipt.
A person can become liable for knowing receipt of non-trust assets 
that were misappropriated from a company (or other principal) by an 
agent acting in breach of fiduciary duty, but only if a new constructive 
or resulting trust arises when the assets are received or perhaps later upon 
rescission of the transaction. Knowledge of the breach of fiduciary duty is 
required, not because it triggers some special form of liability, but because 
it establishes knowledge of the trust or of the facts that gave rise to it. An 
understanding of the law of trusts is not required for someone to know 
112. Robert Chambers, “Distrust: Our Fear of Trusts in the Commercial 
World” (2010) 63 Current Legal Problems 631 at 645-49.
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that the receipt of misappropriated assets gives rise to duties to preserve 
and return those assets to their rightful owner. In much the same way, 
the duties imposed on a finder of lost goods do not depend on a working 
knowledge of the law of bailment.
Since liability for knowing receipt of non-trust assets transferred in 
breach of fiduciary duty is not some special form of accessory liability, 
but merely the ordinary liability for breach of the trust that arises on or 
after receipt, there is no good reason to confine it to cases involving a 
breach of fiduciary duty. The receipt of assets misappropriated by theft 
or fraud should also suffice, provided that a trust arises and the recipient 
has knowledge of the misappropriation. In Evans v European Bank Ltd,113 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the traceable proceeds 
of a credit-card fraud were held by the recipient on resulting trust for the 
victims. This followed the obiter dictum of Millett J (as he then was) in El 
Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings.114 In that case, the fraud on the plaintiff was 
perpetrated through the bribery of his agent. Millett J also considered the 
plight of the other victims:
[t]he plaintiff’s fiduciary … committed a gross breach of his fiduciary 
obligations to the plaintiff, and that is sufficient to enable the plaintiff to 
invoke the assistance of equity. Other victims, however, were less fortunate. 
They employed no fiduciary. They were simply swindled. No breach of any 
fiduciary obligation was involved. It would, of course, be an intolerable 
reproach to our system of jurisprudence if the plaintiff were the only victim 
who could trace and recover his money. Neither party before me suggested 
that this is the case; and I agree with them. But if the other victims of the 
fraud can trace their money in equity it must be because, having been induced 
to purchase the shares by false and fraudulent misrepresentations, they are 
entitled to rescind the transaction and revest the equitable title to the purchase 
money in themselves … There is thus no distinction between their case and the 
plaintiff’s. They can rescind the purchases for fraud, and he for the bribery of 
his agent; and each can then invoke the assistance of equity to follow property 
of which he is the equitable owner. But, if this is correct, as I think it is, then 
the trust which is operating in these cases is not some new model remedial 
constructive trust, but an old-fashioned institutional resulting trust. This may 
be of relevance in relation to the degree of knowledge required on the part of a 
subsequent recipient to make him liable.115
113. Supra note 20.
114. [1993] 3 All ER 717 (Ch).
115. Ibid at 712-13.
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The receipt of the traceable proceeds of theft or fraud should give rise to a 
trust for the victims, even in the absence of a breach of fiduciary duty.116 
The recipient’s knowledge of that theft or fraud should be sufficient 
to trigger personal liability for breach of her or his duties as trustee to 
preserve the assets and restore them to the victims.
Lawyers and judges will continue to use the familiar language of 
knowing receipt. Old habits are hard to break and not all habits are bad. 
Specialist terminology is useful and efficient, but only if those who use 
it both understand and agree on its meaning. If we do continue to use 
that language, we need to understand that we are simply asking whether 
the defendant is personally liable for breach of trust. The answer to that 
question depends on whether the defendant: (a) held assets in trust; (b) 
had knowledge of the trust or the circumstances giving rise to it; and 
then, (c) failed to perform the duties to preserve the trust assets and 
transfer them to the beneficiaries or to the trustees who were properly 
appointed, willing, and able to perform the trust.
116. Robert Chambers, “Trust and Theft” in Elise Bant & Matthew Harding, 
eds, Exploring Private Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010) 223 .
